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ABSTRACT∗ 
 
Diverse Disparities: The Politics and Economics of Wage, Market and 
Disposable Income Inequalities 
by Pablo Beramendi, Thomas R. Cusack 
This paper analyzes the evolution of inequality and its determinants across 
different forms of income. A number of results emerge from this effort. First, 
OECD countries have been and continue to be much more diverse in their 
distributions of earnings and disposable income than they are in their 
distributions of market income. Second, the larger cross-national variation in the 
distributions of earnings and disposable income can be attributed to the role of 
political actors (such as unions and, more importantly, political parties) and 
economic institutions that allow actors to coordinate their activities. Third, the 
transmission of cross-national differences in wage inequality into market-based 
inequality appears to be muted relative to economic and demographic 
transformations that have gone on within the OECD countries. Fourth, the way 
in which political parties are able to pursue their goals varies across forms of 
income. Political parties’ capacity to shape the distribution of earnings is 
contingent on the degree of wage bargaining coordination. Absent coordination 
between labor and capital, right-wing policy works to modestly increase 
inequality. Alternatively, the egalitarian efforts of left-wing parties have the 
undesired effect of raising earnings inequality. In contrast, when labor market 
actors are able to coordinate, left-wing policy reinforces the egalitarian effects of 
coordination whereas the impact of right-wing policy is institutionally 
constrained. In turn, political parties affect directly the distribution of disposable 
income through their choices about fiscal redistribution. 
 
 
Keywords: Income Inequality, Partisan Politics, Institutions, Varieties of 
Capitalism, Redistribution 
JEL Classification: E62, I3, J31, J38 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Facetten der Ungleichheit: Politik und Ökonomie des Lohnes, des Marktes und 
der Ungleichheiten des verfügbaren Einkommens 
 
 
 
In diesem Papier werden die Entwicklungen und die Determinanten der Ungleichheit 
verschiedener Einkommensarten untersucht. Als erstes Ergebnis lässt sicht 
feststellen, dass zwischen den OECD-Ländern größere Unterschiede in der 
Verteilung von Lohneinkommen und verfügbarem Einkommen als in der Verteilung 
von Markteinkommen bestanden und weiterhin bestehen. Zweitens kann die größere 
Variation der Einkommensverteilung über die Länder bezüglich Lohneinkommen und 
verfügbarem Einkommen der Rolle politischer Akteure, wie Gewerkschaften oder, 
noch wichtiger, politische Parteien, zugeschrieben werden. Auch ökonomische 
Institutionen, durch die die Akteure ihre Handlungen koordinieren, spielen eine Rolle. 
Drittens wird die Übertragung von Unterschieden in der Lohnungleichheit auf 
marktbasierte Ungleichheit von den ökonomischen und demografischen 
Transformationen verdeckt, denen die OECD-Länder unterliegen. Viertens variiert die 
Art und Weise, wie politische Parteien ihre Ziele verfolgen können zwischen den 
Einkommensarten. Die Möglichkeit, die Verteilung des Lohneinkommens zu 
beeinflussen, hängt vom Grad der Koordination der Lohnverhandlungen ab. Fehlt 
eine Koordination zwischen den Tarifparteien auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, resultiert aus 
konservativer Politik ein leichter Anstieg der Ungleichheit. Noch stärker tritt der 
unerwünschte Effekt, Lohnungleichheit zu erhöhen, bei den egalitären Bemühungen 
der linken Parteien auf. Im Gegensatz dazu verstärken in einer Situation mit 
koordinierten Arbeitsmarktstrukturen linke Politikmaßnahmen den egalitären Effekt 
der Koordination, während der Wirkung der Politikmaßnahmen rechter Parteien 
institutionell ein Riegel vorgeschoben ist. Die Verteilung des verfügbaren 
Einkommens wiederum wird von den politischen Parteien direkt durch ihre Wahl der 
fiskalischen Umverteilung bestimmt. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important economic issues today is rising income inequality 
(Atkinson, 1999). In Atkinson’s view there is a “transatlantic consensus” on the 
recent developments in economic inequality. This can be characterized as one 
where the steep rise in wage and income inequality seen in the principal Anglo-
Saxon countries during the last decades has inevitably been followed by similar 
rises in most other economies.  Wages and salaries have been shown to be 
growing ever more differentiated as the skill premium ineluctably increases 
(Nickell and Bell 1996; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). In turn, as capital reaps 
ever-greater rewards, those who depend on their own labor are losing out in both 
absolute and relative terms (Phillips, 2002). And, finally, with the retreat of 
government (Korpi and Palme, 2003), a trend that has been widespread over the 
last two decades, the dampening effect of the welfare state on the inequalities 
generated by the labor, financial and other markets has been weakened. In the 
context of these processes, a widely shared view of how income is distributed 
within the industrialized countries is an image of large and ever increasing 
inequality.  
 
We join other scholars (Atkinson, 1999; 2000; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000; 
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2002; Bradley et al., 2003; Iversen and Soskice, 
2003) in taking the position that this “consensus” view is somewhat misleading. 
In particular, it exaggerates the uniformity in trends toward inegalitarian societies. 
The market and the state both shape the distribution of income. However, the 
strength of the roles they play differs across a variety of dimensions, including 
the type of income. The question today is not so much whether politics makes a 
difference for inequality but how political and institutional factors work their 
effects on inequality. While scholars in recent years have begun to pay greater 
attention to the question of income inequality, relatively little effort has yet been 
made to systematically work through the process by which inequalities in terms 
of different incomes are linked together (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2003). This 
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paper explores the sources of variation in the distribution of wages (i.e., 
dependent employment income), market income, and disposable income.  
 
We do this in a series of steps. First, we examine the variation, both over time 
and across countries, in measures of the distribution of income in its different 
forms. Second, we then lay out an argument about how these different income 
distributions are shaped by both economic and non-economic forces. In this 
context, we pay particular attention to the role of government partisanship and 
economic institutions in shaping the distribution of income across OECD 
countries. The third step is to empirically evaluate the argument. We do this by 
specifying a model where the elements of the argument are included and 
estimating the parameters of the model. Thereafter, the implications of these 
parameter estimates are examined. Finally, we draw together our findings and 
discuss their implications. 
 
A number of results emerge from this effort at examining the evolution of the 
distribution of income and its determinants. First, the patterns of cross-national 
variation are quite dissimilar across different forms of income. OECD countries 
have been and continue to be much more diverse in the distributions of earnings 
and disposable income than they are in the distribution of market income. 
Second, the larger cross-national variation in the distributions of earnings and 
disposable income can be attributed to the role of political actors (such as unions 
and, more importantly, political parties) and economic institutions that allow 
actors to coordinate their activities. However, these two sets of factors do not 
bear any influence on the distribution of market income other than the indirect 
effect they have through wage earnings. Third, the transmission of cross-national 
differences in wage inequality into market-based inequality appears to be muted 
relative to economic and demographic transformations that the OECD countries 
are undergoing. Fourth, the way in which political parties are able to pursue their 
goals varies across forms of income.  While political parties are able to directly 
work their effect on the distribution of disposable income through their choices 
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about fiscal redistribution, their capacity to shape the distribution of earnings is 
contingent on the degree of wage bargaining coordination.  
 
II. IS THERE GROWING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY WITHIN THE OECD 
COUNTRIES? 
 
We focus on the distributions of three different forms of income. These include 
wages, market income, and disposable income. Wages are the monetary reward 
a person receives in exchange for the labor they provide an employer. Market 
income, of which wages are a component, is the broadest measure of the income 
an individual derives from the economic system exclusive of government 
transfers. Disposable income reflects the direct effects, after taxes and transfers, 
of government on how market income is ultimately distributed.  
 
Let us turn first to the question of the distribution of wages. For our purposes, 
there are useful data on this variable for thirteen countries. We have aggregated 
these data into five-year period averages. These averages are displayed in terms 
of an index that is conventionally described as the 90/10 ratio (in other words, the 
ratio the earnings of the top 10 percent of wage earners to that of the lowest ten 
percent of wage earners).1 These can be seen in Table 1. 
 
The pattern in over-time wage inequality is mixed across the OECD countries 
over the period from the late 1970s to the late 1990s.2 Some countries 
experienced greater inequality in wage dispersion and some witnessed declines. 
For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, labor markets that 
were marked by already by high levels of wage inequality saw that inequality 
                                                 
1 OECD (1996) describes the national sources and definitions for these data. Note, in line with the 
other two measures of income inequality used in this paper, relating to market and disposable 
income, we would have preferred to use data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
data sets. However, comparability problems on the wage data in LIS would have greatly reduced 
the number of observations that could be used. In addition, the wage data are only available in 
terms of inter-decile ratios and not in any other form, such as the Gini indices that we use in 
conjunction with the LIS-based data. 
 
2 For a detailed review of cross-national patterns in wage inequality and the forces driving it, see 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). 
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surge upward through the 80s and 90s. In other countries, for example, France, 
Finland and Denmark (the latter two marked by initially low levels of inequality), 
experienced very little change in levels of wage inequality over the time periods 
for which we have data. Moreover, in other countries, such as Germany and 
Belgium, low levels of wage inequality shrank even further. 
 
 
Table 1 
Wage Inequality across the OECD Countries 
(90/10 Ratio from OECD, 1996) 
 
Per. AUL BEL CAN DEN FIN FRN GER ITA NET NOR SWE UK US 
1 2.83 ---- 4.02 2.15 2.47 3.23 ---- ---- 2.52 2.07 2.03 3.03 3.80
2 2.84 2.42 4.45 2.19 2.48 3.14 2.91 2.26 2.48 2.11 2.05 3.20 4.14
3 2.85 2.33 4.33 2.17 2.46 3.25 2.73 2.34 2.60 1.98 2.09 3.39 4.35
4 2.88 2.25 4.28 ---- 2.33 3.11 2.79 2.37 2.72 ---- 2.19 3.42 4.56
5 2.95 ---- ---- ---- 2.42 3.05 ---- ---- ---- ---- 2.22 3.42 4.58
 
Note on time periods and country labels: each period is five years in duration and follows the LIS 
wave dating convention with 1 = 1978-82; 2 = 1983-87; 3 = 1988-92; 4=1993-197; 5 = 1998-
2002.  AUL – Australia; BEL – Belgium; CAN – Canada; DEN – Denmark; FIN – Finland; FRN – 
France; GER – Germany; ITA – Italy; NET – Netherlands; NOR – Norway; SWE – Sweden; UK – 
United Kingdom; US – United States.  
 
 
There is no gainsaying that wages are an important component of the income 
that individuals and households derive from the market. Still, however, they are 
only a part of total market-derived income.3 Based on definitions of dependent 
labor and non-labor income in the household accounts derived from Mendoza, et 
al (1994), it is clear that non-dependent labor based income is also very 
important. A sense of this can be derived from Table 2. In this table we present 
three-decade averages of dependent labor income as a share of total household 
market based income and an additional measure of the income derived from 
other market sources. Across the 17 countries for which data are available, we 
can see wage earnings constitute slightly less than seventy percent of household 
                                                 
3 A household’s market income not only includes earnings from dependent employment, but 
those deriving from self-employment as well as interest, dividends, rents and any other income 
from non-state sources. 
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income on average. Correspondingly, the average of thirty percent of this income 
derived from sources other than dependent employment makes up a significant 
part of market income. On the face of it, such flows are likely to be distributed in 
far different ways than are wage earnings. The implications of this for the 
distribution of total market income are clear: this overall market-based distribution 
will be different from the earnings distribution and the forces shaping it will, at 
least in part, be different than those that shape the earnings distribution. 
 
In contrast to the mixed picture on cross-national developments in wage earnings 
distributions, the pattern of change in the distribution of market income is uniform 
across the 11 OECD countries for which data are available (see Table 3 below). 
Regardless of the wage leveling forces in national economies and the 
redistributive character of national taxation and spending regimes, market 
income inequality has been high across these countries and has surged to even 
higher levels over the last two decades. One way to think of the Gini indices 
presented in this table is that each represents the share of total market income 
generated within the economy that would have to be redistributed in order to 
achieve equality across all households in terms of the amount each receives.4 
One sees, for example, that in the United States nearly half of all income would 
need to be redistributed to achieve equality in market outcomes. Even in an 
egalitarian society such as Sweden, the level of inequality in market outcomes is 
extremely high and, at times, has exceeded the levels of inequality seen in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.5 
                                                 
4 In providing a summary measure of the distribution of income the Gini coefficient has the 
disadvantage of potentially obscuring processes taking place in different parts of the distribution 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2003). Note, however, that the arguments throughout the paper are 
concerned with the overall degree of dispersion across forms of income.  
5 A colleague of ours, John Stephens, has suggested that our analysis is misleading because it  
includes pensioners. The concern is that pre-tax inequality in countries with “comprehensive” 
public pensions systems (i.e, the Nordic countries) would be “artificially”  high because 
pensioners in these countries make no provisions for retirement outside the public system. Since 
our concern is with society-wide income inequality, it seems inappropriate to consider only “one 
variant of the working-age population”. We do not deny that the welfare state has as one of its 
primary clients those in retirement age. Indeed the failure of some welfare states to adequately 
support those of pensionable age is a major problem and should not be pushed aside nor 
relegated to the status of a nuisance. Stephens and his co-authors (Bradley et al., 2003: 224-225) 
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In addition, we have data on the distribution of disposable income for 13 OECD 
countries. These are displayed in Table 4. Again, we use the Gini index to 
describe the character of the distributions. Recall that disposable income is equal 
to market income plus government transfers and less taxes. Across all of the 
OECD countries the Gini measures on disposable income are far lower than 
those for market income, thus signifying that direct government intervention 
produces a far more equitable distribution of income. Of course, the scope of this 
intervention varies and with that the breadth of the reduction in inequality. Thus, 
for example in the last period reported (1998-2000), the effective level of 
redistribution varied dramatically between states such as Sweden (18 percent of 
total income) and the United States (8 percent of total income). In terms of 
changes in the overall levels of inequality in disposable income one observes 
that in most of the countries for which we have data the pattern over the last two 
decades has been one that involved a modest increase in the overall level of 
inequality or basically no change (as in the cases of France and the 
Netherlands). Three countries do stand out in terms of the levels of increase in 
the degree of inequality. These include two of the usual suspects, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, as well as the traditional ideal typical welfare 
state, Sweden, which experienced a significant amount of growth in the level of 
inequality in disposable income. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“demonstrate that the assertion that the welfare state merely redistributes income across 
generations is wrong.” We do not deny their contribution nor the fact that the welfare state does 
more than engage in intergenerational redistribution. However, in showing that redistribution is 
not simply across generations, there is no gainsaying that the intergenerational redistribution 
aspect of the welfare state is important to a significant proportion of the citizenry inside the OECD 
countries. In addition, a good deal of cross-class redistribution occurs inside OECD pension 
systems. Most pension systems are not guided exclusively by insurance principles. Finally, as we 
point out later (footnotes 22 and 24), the findings that we will present hold regardless of the 
demographic base used for our income distribution measures.   
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Table 2 
Shares of Household Market Income Derived from Dependent Employment 
and other Sources in Selected OECD Countries, National Averages for 
1965-95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using formulae developed by Mendoza, et al (1994) and based on data 
drawn from the OECD’s National Accounts Statistics, Vol. II (various years), its Labour Force 
Statistics (various years), and the United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 
(various years). 
 
 
 
Percent from 
Dependent 
Employment 
Percent from 
Other Market 
Sources 
Australia 68.8 31.2 
Austria 66.6 33.4 
Belgium 65.3 34.7 
Canada 70.4 29.6 
Denmark 77.4 22.6 
Finland 69.8 30.2 
France 67.9 32.1 
Germany 70.7 29.3 
Ireland 61.2 38.8 
Italy 55.3 44.7 
Japan 68.7 31.3 
Netherlands 66.5 33.5 
Norway 76.0 24.0 
Sweden 78.8 21.2 
Switzerland 71.2 28.8 
United Kingdom 74.5 25.5 
United States 71.9 28.1 
   
Average 69.5 30.5 
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Still, the direct workings of state fiscal systems revealed by combining the figures 
in Tables 3 and 4 are clearly large even if they differ across nations. Thus, in 
states with modest welfare regimes such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, the net amount of total income being redistributed amounted 
anywhere from eight to twelve percent of total income. In Sweden, nearly a 
quarter of this income was redistributed in some periods. The redistribution 
amounted to huge sums in a relative sense with on average around 20 percent in 
the United States and nearly 50 percent in Sweden.6 And while in a number of 
countries, for example, the United States and Sweden, the redistributive effects 
of state fiscal systems declined over time, they rose sharply in other countries, 
such as France and Germany. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Market Income Inequality across the OECD Countries 
(Gini index on household market income* based on LIS data) 
 
Per. AUL BEL CAN DEN FIN FRN GER ITA NET NOR SWE UK US 
1 0.37 ---- 0.36 ---- ---- 0.34 0.31 ---- ---- 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.39 
2 0.40 ---- 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.40 ---- 0.36 0.33 0.43 0.42 0.42 
3 0.41 ---- 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.39 0.41 ---- 0.38 0.37 0.46 0.44 0.42 
4 0.41 ---- 0.39 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.40 ---- 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.45 
5 ---- ---- 0.41 ---- 0.37 ---- 0.44 ---- ---- 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.46 
*Note that income is adjusted for household size using the LIS equivalence scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In passing, we might note that Alesina and Glazer’s recent (2004) book on the differences 
between the United States and Europe in terms of both poverty and the efforts of the state to 
relieve it is somewhat misleading in its portrayal of trans-Atlantic differences in market income 
distribution. It proceeds under the assumption that the gulf in the level of inequality between the 
Americans and Europeans is very wide before taxes and redistribution (pp. 3, 56, 58), indeed far 
wider than it really is, and the authors thereby infer that the European welfare state systems are 
less redistributive than then actually are. A cursory examination of Tables 3 and 4 would show 
how inaccurate Alesina and Glazer’s portrayal is. 
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. 
 
Table 4 
Disposable Income Inequality across the OECD Countries 
(Gini index on household disposable income based on LIS data) 
 
Per. AUL BEL CAN DEN FIN FRN GER ITA NET NOR SWE UK US 
1 0.28 ---- 0.28 ---- ---- 0.29 0.24  ---- 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.30 
2 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.30 0.34 
3 0.30 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.34 0.34 
4 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.26 0.34 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.36 
5 ---- ---- 0.31 ---- 0.25 ---- 0.26 0.35 ---- 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.38 
*Note that income is adjusted for household size using the LIS equivalence scale. 
 
 
 
In sum, there are significant differences in the incidence of inequality across 
OECD countries, but the range of these differences vary across different income 
concepts. More importantly, these differences have not changed dramatically 
over time. Table 5 displays the coefficients of variation in the level of inequality 
for the three forms of income during the first and last periods of the sample. 
These figures help summarize the two main points emerging from the more 
detailed analyses presented in this section. First, the OECD countries have been 
much more diverse in their distributions of earnings and disposable income than 
they were in their distributions of market income. Second, these patterns have 
remained unaltered through the end of the century. If anything, cross-national 
differences in terms of disposable income inequality have increased slightly over 
the last twenty-five years. In the next section we lay out an argument to identify 
the factors at work behind these developments. 
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Table 5  
Cross National Differences* across Measurements of Inequality  
 
 Earnings Inequality Market Income 
Inequality 
Disposable 
Income Inequality 
Wave 1 0.24 0.07 0.15 
Wave 2 0.25 0.09 0.15 
Wave 3 0.26 0.08 0.15 
Wave 4 0.25 0.07 0.16 
Wave 5 0.24 0.07 0.17 
* Differences over time and across income measures are present 
 in terms of coefficients of variation. 
 
 
 
 
III. POLITICAL PARTIES, INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY 
 
A variety of factors shape the distributions of income within society. Not all 
of these are economic. Politics also plays a role.  We assume that the role 
politics plays is very central and immediate in the case of the wage 
distribution and the final (i.e., disposable) income distribution. In contrast we 
assume its role in shaping the distribution of market income to be very 
indirect and subtle. Included in government’s repertoire of policy 
instruments are tools that allow it to shape distribution in the labor market 
and disposable income. These instruments include regulations, taxes and 
transfers.  
 
Regulations such as minimum wage laws affect the distribution of earnings.  
Taxes and transfers are obvious and sometimes powerful determinants of 
the distribution of disposable income. But these instruments of government 
policy also affect pre-fiscal income through the anticipatory behavioural 
responses on the parts of labor and capital (Beramendi 2001).  Labor 
responses come in the form of labor supply decisions. Capital responds by 
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adjusting its investment decisions and levels of labor demand. 
Consequently, their impact on pre-fiscal income should be primarily 
reflected in the distribution of earnings in the labor market. Government is 
much more constrained in its actions in other markets, for example finance. 
These volatile markets are sensitive to government intervention and thereby 
deter governments from seeking to directly influence the shape of the 
distribution of overall market income.  In the rest of this section we set out to 
analyze the role of political factors in shaping the distribution of income. 
 
 The role of politics can be understood in terms of institutions and the 
ideological preferences of governments. There is a long tradition in political 
science that sees partisanship as having a central role in the creation of 
public policy (Hibbs 1977, 1987, 1992). Parties are seen as agents of 
different economic interests. Parties on the left are viewed as representing 
the interests of labor. Parties on the right are held to be agents of more 
affluent classes. Thus, left-wing governments are expected to tax, spend 
and regulate more with the aim of achieving an equitable society.7  
Analogously, parties on the right are expected to implement public policies 
that preserve inequitable outcomes deriving from the workings of the 
market.  
 
A second tradition in political science, one that also has its advocates in 
economics, has highlighted the importance of labor market institutions in 
shaping the distribution of wage income (Wallerstein, 1999; Iversen and 
Wren, 1998). The effects of labor market institutions are both direct and 
indirect. The direct effects can be seen in the constraints imposed on the 
behaviour of labor and capital. Indirect effects are found in the way in which 
these institutions filter the impact of other determinants of inequality, most 
prominently government partisanship (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). In 
                                                 
7 There is a fairly large literature on aspects of this, including Hibbs and Dennis (1988), Bartels 
(2003), Hicks and Swank (1984), Mahler (2001),  Bradley et al. (2003),  and Iversen and Soskice  
(2003).  
 12
what follows, we lay out an argument in which the effects highlighted by 
these two traditions can be understood. 
 
Left-wing policy aims at reducing income inequality. This goal is achieved in 
a variety of ways. In the case of wage equality these paths include higher 
minimum wages, higher levels of benefit generosity and higher labor 
income tax rates. Higher minimum wages raise the wage floor directly. 
Higher levels of generosity raise the wage floor indirectly, by increasing the 
reservation wage.8 Both compress the earnings distribution from the 
bottom. In turn, higher tax rates on labor income reduce the incentives for 
wage increases in the upper half of the distribution, compressing the 
distribution from the top. Taken together, all three policies have the effect of 
reducing wage inequality.  Left-wing parties also reduce the inequality of 
disposable income by setting higher levels of taxes and transfers. 
 
Alternatively, non-left-wing governments pursue a different type of policy.  
These governments can be either from a Christian Democratic or from a 
more liberal tradition. Christian Democratic regimes are associated with 
entitlements based on the insurance principle, the maintenance of status 
differences and the subsidiary correction of market outcomes (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Kersbergen, 1995; Huber and Stephens, 2001). In 
implementing these principles Christian Democratic governments combine 
medium levels of tax burdens with a heavy reliance on social security 
contributions and public transfers. While there is no reason to anticipate that 
this policy reduces wage inequality, a certain degree of income 
redistribution is to be expected.  The egalitarian impact of this policy, 
however, is likely to be smaller than that of policy of a left-wing government. 
In turn, right-wing liberal policy is anchored in the tenet that the market 
should be the dominating mechanism of resource allocation in society. 
Taxes, transfers and regulations are minimized and, as a result, the 
                                                 
8 This is the wage rate at which a person is exactly indifferent between working and not working.  
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expected redistributive effect of government policy is at its lowest level. 
Therefore, liberal policies are expected to lead to higher levels of both 
earnings and income inequality. 
 
Political parties are not the only actors shaping the distribution of income. 
Trade unions and employers’ associations also play a significant role. Let 
us turn our attention first to unions. Their impact is to be seen in both wage 
inequality and redistribution. Unions have an aversion to wage inequality. 
The stronger the union movement the greater this aversion; to the extent 
that this greater strength rests on the inclusion of low wage earners, the 
aversion is heightened (Freeman, 1980). The power resources approach to 
the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983; and Stephens, 
1979) emphasizes the strength of the working class. The extent to which it 
is organized, for example in unions, enhances its abilities to influence 
government policy. With this influence, the working class is able to push for 
and achieve a greater redistributive effort on the part of government and 
thereby reduce the level of inequality in disposable income.   
 
Accounts of redistribution and inequality based on the power of the working 
class tend to see employers as passive agents endorsing a unitary 
opposition to state intervention and redistribution. Yet employers’ 
preferences about state regulations and redistribution vary, among other 
things, according to the size, the sector of production and the skill intensity 
of the firms (Mares, 2003).  Moreover, they are far from being mere 
spectators.  The control by employers of the levels of private investment 
and labor demand gives employers associations a great deal of leverage 
over government policy. More specifically the potential reaction by 
employers may operate as a veto against particular forms of taxes, 
transfers and regulations. This implies that both unions and employers’ 
associations have an input into the politics of inequality. As a result, an 
important part of the explanation of government policy and its distributive 
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effects lies in the way in which the interplay between unions, employers and 
the incumbent party is institutionalized. This brings us to the issue of 
coordination within the economy. 
 
The degree of wage coordination between capital and labor is 
conventionally regarded as a crucial aspect of the difference between 
Liberal (LME) and Coordinated (CME) Market Economies (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Let us consider briefly the nature of such differences and 
their implications for the politics of inequality. In LMEs, firms coordinate their 
activities via competitive market arrangements. Relations between capital 
and labor are organized by individuals and not by associations. Capitalists 
value their capacity to adjust to market fluctuations; and so too does labor 
by investing in portable, general skills. Neither has an incentive to 
coordinate outside the market. Alternatively, markets are organized very 
differently in CMEs. Firms find incentives to coordinate with unions and the 
government around a fundamental “non-market based” equilibrium between 
capital and labor. An equilibrium such as this becomes politically effective 
via the wage coordination compromise between capital, labor and the 
government. 
 
By virtue of this compromise labor agrees to restrain wage demands, 
thereby contributing to lower inflation and better economic conditions, but 
most importantly for itself, gains a degree of income insurance for workers. 9 
Government uses fiscal policy to compensate labor for its sacrifice and 
thereby reduces the costs of the compromise. It does this through a large 
welfare state that provides labor with an insurance system that guarantees 
both a good income level in periods of economic downturns and longer-term 
earnings (pensions). In addition, labor unions obtain higher leverage in 
wage negotiations and greater political control over the implementation of a 
                                                 
9 For a detailed characterization of the nature of this compromise see Cameron (1984), 
Regini (1984),  Wallerstein, Golden and Lange (1997),  and Wallerstein and Golden (2000). 
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large number of public policies (Coe and Snower, 1997; Swenson and 
Pontusson, 2000).  
 
This compromise between capital and labor is only one facet of the overall 
level of non-market-based coordination in CMEs that distinguish them from 
LMEs. The institutional arrangements of corporate governance and their 
interplay with the workings of labor markets are also part of the picture.  
Firms within CMEs rely more on bank-based than on equity-based sources 
of corporate finance and display higher levels of cross-shareholding. By 
virtue of these arrangements, investors privilege long-term performance and 
firms pool risks. This institutional setup creates the conditions for long-term 
investments both by firms and employees (specific skills). As a result the 
pressure on companies and workers to maintain continuous levels of 
profitability is reduced. This, in turn, facilitates the sustainability of the 
compromise within the labor market (Gingerich and Hall, 2000). 
 
This way of organizing the economy generates a number of distributive 
effects. Within the labor market the institutional position of unions is 
enhanced. Therefore, unions are better positioned to push for their 
preferred egalitarian wage distribution, which should be reflected in lower 
levels of wage inequality (Wallerstein, 1999). The distributive consequences 
of coordination go beyond the labor market.10  By making firms’ decisions 
less responsive to expected short-term profits, corporate governance 
arrangements in CMEs create the conditions for employers to accept a 
large welfare state. This acceptance facilitates income redistribution and, 
other things being equal, should be reflected in lower levels of disposable 
income inequality. 
                                                 
10 In the empirical analysis of the paper we incorporate this distinction between two different 
types of coordination. When we analyze the impact of coordination on wage inequality 
(Table 9) we restrict our measure of coordination to wage bargaining processes within the 
labor market. Alternatively, in the case of disposable income inequality (Table 11), we use 
a broader measure, one that captures the overall coordination within the economy 
(Gingerich and Hall, 2002).  
 16
 
In addition to these direct effects, the degree of coordination matters 
because of its interaction with partisan politics. According to one view in the 
literature (Pontusson, Rueda and Way, 2002; Rueda and Pontusson, 2002), 
high levels of coordination between capital and labor constrain the impact of 
parties on public policy and therefore mute the impact of partisanship on the 
distribution of income. The intuition behind this argument is that collective 
agreements generally incorporate all workers in a company or sector 
regardless of union membership status and that wage developments across 
firms and industries are at least indirectly tied to one another. Given these 
conditions it is difficult to entertain the notion that government can 
significantly influence these autonomous bargaining agreements and thus 
influence wage distribution (Pontusson, Rueda and Way, 2002). Stated in 
more abstract terms, high levels of wage bargaining coordination have the 
effect of muting partisan effects on wage inequality. 
 
Our view on how the interplay between political parties and labor market 
institutions affects income inequality is different. We contend that high 
levels of wage bargaining coordination facilitate the implementation of left-
wing policy and constrain the implementation of policies favored by the 
right. In contrast, the absence of coordination between capital and labor 
facilitates the implementation of right-wing preferences and constraints the 
egalitarian effects of left-wing policy. Let us elaborate on why this position 
seems more plausible than that held by Pontusson, Rueda and Way (2002). 
 
Coordination reduces the resistance of employers to a generous welfare 
state and constrains the economic costs of redistribution by ensuring the 
agreement of unions to wage moderation. In addition, the agreement 
between capital and labor facilitates the adoption of significantly higher 
taxes on labor income (Cusack and Beramendi, 2003). Thus, in such 
institutional context left-wing parties are free to use the main tools at their 
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disposal to reduce wage inequality without incurring in negative economic 
externalities. In this sense left-wing incumbency and wage bargaining 
coordination reinforce each other’s egalitarian effects on the wage 
distribution. As a result, we would expect wage inequality to be at its lowest 
levels in those countries where coordination is high and left-wing parties are 
in power. In addition, left-wing parties will be able to develop a large and 
very generous welfare state (among other reasons to compensate unions 
for wage moderation), leading to a greater reduction in disposable income 
inequality.  
 
In contrast, strong coordination creates a hostile environment for the 
implementation of right-wing policy. High levels of coordination imply that 
both employers and unions enjoy a certain degree of veto power over 
government policy. While in coordinated economies employers may be 
divided about a left-wing policy, unions will certainly oppose any attempt at 
market flexibilization and welfare state reduction put forward by right-wing 
parties. Therefore, these parties will see that their actual policy is much 
further away from their initial position than it would be in the case of a social 
democratic government. As a result, if right-wing parties hold office in highly 
coordinated environments, earnings and disposable income inequality are 
likely to reach intermediate levels.   
 
The picture changes in the absence of coordination. Under such conditions, 
right-wing parties receive the full support of employers and leave unions 
with far less institutional leverage.  A right-wing party’s capacity to let the 
market work as freely as possible is not constrained and, therefore, one 
would expect inequality to be higher across all forms of income.  
 
The absence of coordination also has implications for the capacity of left-
wing parties to promote their distributional goals. While these parties retain 
their capacity to compress the distribution of disposable income through 
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fiscal redistribution, their leverage to affect wage inequality is much more 
limited. In coordinated contexts, the government uses fiscal policy as a 
mean to influence the behaviour of labor and capital within wage 
agreements. In the absence of coordination, the signals sent by government 
through its fiscal policy are less effective in shaping union behaviour. 
Unions have no guarantee that the government and the employers will 
agree to the development of a large public insurance system. Hence, 
unions have no incentive to agree to wage moderation. Additionally, there is 
no enticement for them to accept the burden of higher taxes on labor 
needed so as to sustain a generous welfare state (Cusack and Beramendi, 
2003). Rather, unions will demand large levels of redistribution while still 
pressing for nominal increases to sustain real wages. Under such 
conditions, governments lack the capacity to trade income insurance for 
wage moderation and high taxes on labor.   As a result, there is no reason 
to expect that left-wing parties are able to compress significantly the shape 
of wage distribution.  
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Table 6 
Political Parties, Wage Bargaining Coordination and Wage Inequality 
 
POLITICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS 
POLICY CHOICES POLITICAL 
PROCESS 
EXPECTED 
LEVELS  OF 
WAGE 
INEQUALITY 
 
 
High levels of Wage 
Bargaining 
Coordination/Left- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
Union wage moderation 
 
High welfare state 
generosity 
 
High taxes on labor 
 
Left-wing policy 
and coordination 
reinforce each 
other 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High Levels of Wage 
Bargaining 
Coordination/Right- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
Union wage moderation 
 
Medium welfare state 
generosity 
 
Medium levels taxes on 
labor 
 
 
 
Coordination 
constrains right-
wing policy 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low Levels of Wage 
Bargaining 
Coordination/Left- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
No union wage 
moderation 
 
High welfare state 
generosity 
 
Medium levels taxes on 
labor 
 
 
Lack of 
coordination 
constrains left-wing 
policy 
 
 
High  
 
 
Low Levels of Wage 
Bargaining 
Coordination/Right- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
No union wage 
moderation 
 
Low welfare state 
generosity 
 
Low levels taxes on labor 
 
 
 
 
Right-wing policy is 
facilitated by lack 
of coordination 
 
 
 
High 
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Table 7 
Political Parties, Economic Institutions and Disposable Income Inequality 
 
POLITICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITIONS 
POLICY CHOICES POLITICAL 
PROCESS 
EXPECTED 
LEVELS  OF 
DISPOSABLE 
INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
 
 
High Overall 
Coordination in the 
Economy /Left- Wing 
Incumbency 
 
Union wage moderation 
 
High welfare state 
generosity 
 
High taxes on labor 
 
 
 
Left-wing parties 
and unions 
promote 
redistribution 
 
Coordination 
facilitates 
redistribution 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High Overall 
Coordination in the 
Economy /Right- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
Union wage moderation 
 
Medium welfare state 
generosity 
 
Medium levels taxes on 
labor 
 
 
Right-wing parties 
oppose 
redistribution 
 
Coordination 
facilitated by 
redistribution 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low Overall 
Coordination in the 
Economy /Left- Wing 
Incumbency 
 
No union wage 
moderation 
 
High welfare state 
generosity 
 
Medium levels taxes on 
labor 
 
Left-wing parties 
and unions 
promote 
redistribution 
 
Non-coordination 
limits redistribution 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
Low Overall 
Coordination in the 
Economy /Right- 
Wing Incumbency 
 
No union wage 
moderation 
 
Low welfare state 
generosity 
 
Low levels taxes on labor 
 
 
Right-wing parties 
oppose 
redistribution 
 
 
Non-coordination 
limits redistribution 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
In sum, this section has outlined the process by which political parties and 
institutions shape the distribution of income. Table 6 summarizes the expected 
relationships between different political and institutional conditions and the levels 
of wage inequality. As we have argued above, the effect of government 
partisanship is contingent on the level of wage bargaining  coordination. For the 
reasons presented, we expect to observe partisan effects only when the level of 
wage bargaining coordination is high. Alternatively, in the absence of 
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coordination, the egalitarian effects of left- wing policy are muted and no partisan 
differences are expected. In addition, Table 7 recapitulates the expected 
relationships between political parties, economic institutions and disposable 
income inequality. Here the anticipated pattern is different. Partisan differences 
with respect to the welfare state and redistribution are expected at all levels of 
coordination of the economy. In the next two sections of this paper we turn to an 
empirical assessment of these arguments. 
 
 
IV. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
 
The empirical evaluation of the arguments contained in the previous section 
requires one to assess the impact of political and institutional factors as well as 
other conditioning factors on the distribution of income. Moreover, in conformity 
with the arguments, it demands that three different forms of income be treated as 
the objects of explanation. We accomplish all of this by specifying and estimating 
the system of three equations detailed below: 
 
ititititit UDFPTWIMEWI 43211 ββββα ++++=                            (1) 
+ 1765 * εβββ +++ itititit WBCLGWBCLG  
 
210982 εβββα ++++= itititit OPSMCWIMI                               (2) 
 
3141312113 εββββα +++++= ititititit LGUDECMIDI                  (3) 
 
 
Wage inequality (WI), market income inequality (MI), and disposable income 
inequality (DI) are the dependent variables in this system.11 The interdependence 
across the equations is restricted. This can be seen in the fact that the 
dependent variable of the first equation, WI, is independent of the other two 
                                                 
11 The variable WI is the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile of the distribution of 
earnings of full time employees. Sources include the OECD’s Employment Outlook from 1996 
and data provided to us by Lane Kenworthy of Emory University. MI is the Gini index for market 
income. This household based measure is corrected for variations in household size using the 
LIS equivalence scale. DI is the Gini index for household disposable income. It, too, is corrected 
for variations in household size using the LIS equivalence scale. Both MI and DI have been 
calculated using the LIS data accessed over the Internet. 
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equations’ dependent variables, while the second, MI, depends on a set of 
exogenous variables plus the dependent variable of the first equation, WI, and 
the third dependent variable, DI, is a function of the second, MI, and another set 
of exogenous variables. 
 
A system of equations such as this has a variety of labels including recursive, 
triangular, and hierarchic. Whatever one wishes to call it, such a system can be 
consistently estimated with equation by equation Ordinary Least Squares (Green, 
2000).  We have employed a number of different estimation techniques in this 
effort. In one, a less conservative strategy, we employed single equation 
techniques. Two alternative methods were used here, OLS with robust standard 
errors and OLS with panel corrected standard errors (pcse). The results are 
practically identical and so we report only the estimates based on the robust 
standard errors. 12  In the second, more conservative tack, we employed two 
stage least squares, a technique that takes into account the limited 
interdependence across the equations.  
 
Each observation represents a five-year average. The five-year periods conform 
to the LIS aggregation convention (see note to Table 1) and, as in the tables 
presented earlier, the series extends from 1978-82 through 1998-2002. As 
evident in some of the tables in the second section of the paper, limited data on 
income inequality restrict the number of observations available. Compounding 
this restriction, a number of cases are lost because of missing observations on 
the independent variables used in our analysis. At any rate, using a panel design, 
there are 41 cases where all the income inequality data plus data on the 
independent variables are available. The countries included in this restricted 
sample are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. For 
                                                 
12 We do not report the results based on pcse estimates because of the small number of time 
units in our data set. As Wallerstein and Moene (2003) point out, panel corrected standard errors 
may be less accurate under such a condition.  Nevertheless, the pcse-based results are almost 
identical to those results deriving from OLS with robust standard errors as reported in the next 
section. The results using pcse’s are available from the authors. 
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some countries we have as many as five observations. The sample is smaller for 
other countries, sometimes having as few as two cases. 
 
Turning to the substantive content of the equations, let us outline the reasoning 
that stands behind the forms specified. We first address the wage inequality 
equation (1). The first three terms included on the right hand side of this equation 
represent a variety of factors that are meant to control for important 
transformations going on inside the labor market of all of the OECD economies 
that can be expected to have significant effects on the distribution of wages. 
 
First, ME is the number of manufacturing workers expressed as a percentage of 
the working age population. This term is meant to represent the effects of 
deindustrialization and its inegalitarian impact as people lose jobs in the relatively 
high-paying manufacturing sector and need to take on lower paying positions in 
services (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Both the sectoral employment and age cohort 
variables come from various annual issues of the OECD’s Labour Force 
Statistics. We would anticipate that the sign on this variable’s parameter ( 1β ) will 
be negative. In effect, as the manufacturing sector employs a greater share of 
the working age population, the level of wage inequality declines.  Alternatively, 
as the share of employment in this relatively high paying sector declines, the 
level of wage inequality should increase.  
 
The second economic variable included is TWI, which stands for imports from the 
Third World. This variable is expressed as a percentage of GDP. The trade data 
derive from various annual issues of the IMF’s Directory of Trade Statistics. The 
GDP data come from the IMF Financial Statistics cd-rom. TWI’s inclusion is 
justified by the need to control for the effects of third world competition on wage 
levels in the manufacturing sector and their implications for the overall 
distribution of wages (Wood, 1995; Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999; Mahler et 
al., 1999; and Alderson and Nielsen, 2002). Our expectation is that the effect of 
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this variable, captured in the parameter 2β , is positive; in other words, higher 
levels of Third World imports raise the level of wage inequality.  
 
The last of the three economic controls is the female labor force participation 
rate, FP. This factor has been introduced in order to control for the inegalitarian 
consequence of high numbers of women being employed in the labor market. 
This distributional effect derives mainly from the wage discrimination practiced 
against women (Blau and Kahn, 2000).13 In operational terms, FP is the number 
of women working expressed as a percentage of the female working age 
population. The sources for these data are various annual issues of the OECD’s 
Labour Force Statistics. Note that the expectation is that the parameter ( 3β ) 
capturing the effect of this variable is positive; higher levels of female labor force 
participation increase the level of overall wage inequality in the distribution of 
labor market earnings. 
 
In addition to this set of economic controls, equation 1 includes a group of 
political and institutional terms reflecting the arguments presented in the last 
section. A compressing effect on the distribution of wage earnings can be seen in 
the level of union density measure, itUD . This term is meant to capture the 
strength of the labor movement and its capacity to achieve a valued goal of 
egalitarian wage structure.14 The anticipation here is that the parameter ( 4β ) on 
this term would take on a negative value. 
 
This brings us to the cluster of variables dealing with government partisanship 
(LG) and wage bargaining coordination (WBC). We need not rehearse here the 
                                                 
13 Clearly there are other dimensions of female labor force participation that affect wage 
inequality, such as the greater likelihood of women taking part time jobs because of competing 
family burdens (Esping-Andersen, 2002). Note, however, that the wage inequality data used in 
this paper refer only to full time workers.  
14 Union density is a measure of labor strength. It is expressed as the percentage of the total 
labor force that holds membership in one or another labor union. These data were generously 
provided by Michael Wallerstein.  
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lengthy argument about why these two variables, alone and in interaction with 
each other, have been introduced into the equation. This argument was laid out 
extensively in section 3. The partisan term used is based on a long-term 
measure, and is labeled left government inheritance. It represents the average of 
the last twenty years of a government ideology term.15 We assume that the 
effects of the ideological position of government are not all immediate and, 
indeed, many are likely to slowly work their effect through time.  Recall that in the 
absence of wage bargaining coordination, we do not anticipate that this variable 
has a discernable effect. Thus the parameter ( 5β ) for the partisan inheritance is 
not expected to be significantly different from zero. A more straightforward effect 
for the wage bargaining coordination variable is expected. Thus, the parameter 
(
6
β ) on that variable is anticipated to be negative. That is, as the degree of 
coordination in wage bargaining rises, the level of wage inequality declines. The 
wage bargaining coordination variable ranges in value from zero, absence of 
coordination, to 4, the highest level of coordination. 16 Finally, the parameter ( 7B ) 
on the interaction between these two terms, partisan inheritance and wage 
bargaining coordination, is predicted to be negative, which is in keeping with our 
argument that coordination in the labor market facilitates the egalitarian effect of 
left-wing government policy. 
 
In the second equation, that for market income, there are three variables on the 
right hand side.  The first is wage inequality, WI. Since an appreciable amount of 
market income derives from dependent labor, it is clear that the level of inequality 
in the former is necessarily dependent on the degree of inequality in wages. 
                                                 
15 This variable is a measure of the center of political gravity that characterizes the cabinet. The 
ideology measure is based on the relative strength of the parties in the cabinet and a composite 
of terms describing the parties’ positions on the role of the state in the economy (as reflected in 
the content analysis based measures of the Comparative Manifesto Project).  Documentation on 
the data is to be found in Cusack and Engelhardt (2002). 
 
16 The wage coordination index, WBC, used has been developed by Lane Kenworthy. He 
describes the logic behind the scale in his 2002 World Politics article. The data set and 
documentation is available on his web page, http://www. emory.edu/SOC/lkenworthy 
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Thus, we the expectation is that the sign on 8B  will be positive. The second 
variable expected to directly influence the level of market income inequality is 
that degree of stock market capitalization, SMC.17 We anticipate that this variable 
has an inegalitarian effect in that only those with some degree of wealth and/or 
high incomes can afford to take advantage of the opportunity to earn even more 
income. Thus, expect that 9B  will have a positive and statistically significant sign. 
Finally, to capture the inequality heightening effect on market income of a 
growing pension-age population, we include a demographic measure, OP, which 
has been operationalized as the percentage of the total population in retirement 
age, i.e., 65 and older.18 Again, the expectation on the parameter ( 10B ) for this 
variable is that it will be positive.19 
 
The final equation deals with the inequality in disposable income. Our equation 
concentrates on the political and institutional determinants of fiscal redistribution 
which, given the distribution of market income, ultimately raises or lowers that 
distributional measure. We use as a control variable the current level of market 
income inequality. This allows us to isolate the effect of the variables of interest 
from all other determinants of the distribution of disposable income (Beramendi 
2001). In line with our argument, for a given level of market income inequality, 
the level of inequality in disposable income is specified as a function of union 
density (UD), the overall degree of coordination within the economy (CE) and 
government partisanship (LG). While in the wage inequality equation it was 
appropriate to restrict the measurement of coordination to the wage bargaining 
agreements between employers and employees, here we employ a more 
                                                 
17 SMC represents stock market capitalization expressed as a percentage of GDP. The data are 
drawn from the World Bank’s Database on Financial Structure and Economic Development. This 
is available on the World Bank web page, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm. 
 
18 The sources for these data are various annual issues of the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics. 
 
19 Note that for this equation we employed two different estimation techniques and both are 
reported below. The first is the simple OLS with robust standard errors. The second is two-stage 
least squares (TSLS). 
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encompassing indicator of the level of coordination within the economy (Hall and 
Gingerich 2002:12-16). The Hall and Gingerich measure captures other 
dimensions of coordination, such as the structure of corporate governance, as 
well as the existing complementarities between corporate governance and the 
labor relations system.20  Our expectations regarding the parameters in this 
equation are that, aside from that for the positive effect of the market income 
inequality variable, all of the others take on negative signs. That is to say, the 
institutional and partisan terms act to reduce inequality. Finally, note that the 
estimation techniques employed are similar to the ones implemented in the case 
of market income inequality. We turn now to discuss our empirical findings. 
 
The estimation results for wage inequality equation are based on OLS with 
robust standard errors. The results are reported in Table 8. Let us first comment 
on the set of control variables, those meant to capture the social and economic 
transformations in OECD labor markets. The anticipated inegalitarian effect of 
deindustrialization ( 1β ) on wage inequality is not observed. Nor is the impact of 
wage competition through the increase in imports from the third world ( 2β ) as 
expected.  The estimated parameters for these two control variables are 
indistinguishable from zero. However, the anticipated distributive impact of 
increasing female participation in labor force ( 3β >0) receives support.  The levels 
of wage dispersion are significantly higher as more women enter the labor force 
in OECD countries. Fixing the value of all other independent variables, a 
significant increase, that is one standard deviation or 8.6 %, in the female labor 
force participation rates would lead wage inequality to grow by 14%.  
 
 
                                                 
20 EC is a measure of economy wide coordination. We have used Hall and Gingerich’s index of 
economic coordination. The source for these data is Daniel W. Gingerich and Peter A. Hall’s 
(2002) paper “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political 
Economy: An Empirical Analysis.” 
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Table 8 Estimation Results for the Wage  
Inequality Equation (Equation # 1) 
 
 
 OLS 
(robust se) 
 
Manufacturing  
Employment 
 
.012  
(.020) 
 
 
Imports from Third 
World 
 
 
-.013 
(.838) 
 
Female L. Force 
Participation Rate 
 
.018** 
(.008) 
 
Union Density 
 
-.017*** 
(.004) 
 
Left Government 
Inheritance 
 
.533 *** 
(.193) 
 
Wage Bargaining 
Coordination 
 
-.137 
(.09) 
 
Left Government 
Inheritance*Wage 
Coordination  
 
 
 
-.209*** 
(.062) 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
2.53 *** 
(.657) 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2=.86 
n = 41 
 
 
*** p<.01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
 
The strength of the union movement displays the anticipated egalitarian effect on 
the wage distribution. The coefficient for union density ( 4β ) is both negative and 
statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, a 5% increase in the level of union 
density would reduce the level of wage inequality by 6.5%. Thus, countries with 
strong and encompassing unions will be marked by much lower levels of wage 
inequality than societies where no such unions exist.  
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Examining the estimates on the institutional and partisan variables ( 5β  to 7β ) 
allows one to portray how the interplay between government partisanship and 
wage bargaining coordination shapes wage inequality.  A useful approach to 
analyze the impact of these two terms is to present their conditional coefficients 
and standard errors. Graph 1 displays how the effect of wage bargaining 
coordination is contingent on different values of government partisanship. In turn, 
Graph 2 presents the slope of government partisanship on wage inequality given 
different levels of wage bargaining coordination. 
 
The reader should focus on two central features of Graph 1. The first is brought 
into relief by noting that the values on the vertical dimension are all negative. In 
essence, this is telling us that the effect of wage coordination is to always reduce 
wage inequality. The second feature is the amplifying effect of leftist partisan 
inheritance. Wage coordination’s egalitarian impact rises as the level of left 
partisan inheritance increases. This result suggests the existence, highlighted by 
our argument, of a mutually reinforcing effect between high levels of wage 
bargaining coordination and a long history of government dominated by the left.  
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Graph 1
 Effects of wage bargaining coordination contingent on the 
levels of partisanship inheritance
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Just as partisanship moderates the impact of wage coordination, so, too, is the 
impact of partisan inheritance conditional upon the levels of wage bargaining 
coordination (see Graph 2). For example, where one has little or no wage 
coordination a right-wing partisan inheritance will modestly elevate the levels of 
wage inequality, while a left-wing partisan inheritance will have the perverse 
effect of increasing that inequality to even greater levels. On the other hand, 
when one has a completely centralized wage bargaining coordination 
environment, the left finds itself in a favorable situation; the greater the level of 
leftist partisan inheritance, the higher the egalitarian effect on wage distribution. 
 
 
 31
Graph 2
Effects of partisanship inheritance contingent on the levels of 
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This point is conveyed by Table 9 where the predicted levels of wage inequality 
under different partisan and institutional conditions are reported.21 In non-
coordinated environments, left-wing policy is not only incapable of creating wage 
equality (as anticipated by our argument); it also seems to be the source of a 
number of behavioural responses by market actors that drive wage inequality in a 
direction opposite that intended by the government. Alternatively, an institutional 
environment with high levels of coordination constrains the inegalitarian effects of 
right-wing policies. In sum, our conception of the relationship between partisan 
politics, wage bargaining coordination and wage inequality receives a good deal 
of empirical support. 
 
 
                                                 
21 High coordination refers to the maximum value of the wage bargaining coordination index in our 
data set, which is 4.  The lack of coordination implies fragmented wage bargaining (0).  The 
partisan inheritance values are the same values reported on the horizontal axis of Graph 1. A 
value of 0.27 represents right-wing partisan inheritance, whereas a value of 1.77 captures the far 
left partisan inheritance. 
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Table 9 
Predicted Values of Wage Inequality *  
 
 High  Wage Bargaining 
Coordination 
No Wage 
Bargaining 
Coordination 
Left-Wing  
Government 
 
2.16 
 
4.09 
Right-Wing 
Government 
 
2.51 
 
3.29 
*Predictions based on parameter estimates in Table 9. All other variables are at their mean 
values. 
 
Turning now to the equation on market-based income inequality two sets of 
estimation results are presented in Table 10. The goodness of fit measures are 
the same across the two techniques used, namely OLS with robust standard 
errors and two-stage least squares. All the parameter estimates obtained ( 8β  to 
10β ) display the expected signs and are statistically significant. Substantively, the 
estimated effects are of similar size with the exception of the parameter ( 8β ) on 
wage inequality. This parameter has a significant and positive effect in both 
estimations. However, it is nearly twice as high in the two stage least squares 
results. Depending upon the estimate used, if we keep the other variables in the 
equation at their mean and allow wage inequality to change from its minimum 
(2.00) to its maximum (4.6) value, then the relative increase in the size of the Gini 
index for market-based inequality would be seven percent in the case of OLS 
estimates and seventeen percent in the case of two stage least squares 
estimates. The transmission of cross-national differences in wage inequality to 
market-based income inequality appears to be muted in comparison to other 
factors.22  Clearly other elements not related to the labor market are also at work 
in shaping the distribution of market income. 
                                                 
22  The reader should note that these results hold even when we adjust our analysis to take into 
account the suggestions by John Stephens (see footnote 5). As Stephens points out, if his 
criticisms holds, the impact of the wage dispersion term on market-based income inequality 
should be much stronger than the results we report. We examined this possibility. First, we 
calculated the Ginis of market based inequality for the more restricted population group Bradley 
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Table 10: Estimation Results for the Market-Based  
Income Inequality Equation (Equation # 2) 
 
 OLS 
(robust se) 
TSLS 
(se) 
 
Wage 
Earnings 
Inequality 
 
.015* 
(.008) 
 
 
.027 ** 
(.011) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalization
 
.025*** 
(.007) 
 
.021 *** 
(.006) 
 
Pension Age 
Population 
 
.009*** 
(.002) 
 
.011*** 
(.003) 
 
Constant 
 
.250*** 
(.060) 
 
.176** 
(.085) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2=.58 
n = 41 
 
 
 
R 2=.58 
n = 41 
 
 
*** p<.01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
The degree of stock market capitalization is one of these. As anticipated, the 
estimated parameter ( 9β ) is positive and statistically significant. This is 
consistent with the notion that in countries where participation in the stock market 
is heavily regulated by the government the ability of wealthy families to increase 
their income is constrained. Alternatively, countries with unregulated stock 
markets provide wealthy families with an opportunity to profit from their assets, 
                                                                                                                                                 
et al. (2003) employ.  Second, we replaced the variable measuring the share of pension age 
population with the unemployment rate. We then estimated the equation using both OLS with 
robust standard errors and two stage least squares. The estimates obtained are similar to those 
reported in Table 11. The parameter estimate using OLS on these data is .018 as opposed to 
.015. In turn, the parameter estimate using TSLS on these data is .041 as opposed to .027. The 
complete results for the two estimated equations are available from the authors upon request. We 
do not see the fact that these parameters are slightly larger as undermining our argument.  We 
address this issue again when discussing the results on the estimates for the disposable income 
inequality model in footnote 24. 
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thereby broadening the distribution of market-based income.  In addition, the 
parameter ( 10B ) capturing the effect of the share of pension age population 
displays the expected sign and is significantly different from zero. This result 
supports the expectation that as the share of population that has completed the 
transition from the labor market into retirement increases, market-based 
inequality also increases as these people lose their principal market-based 
income, wages and salaries from employment.  
  
Finally, Table 11 reports parameter estimates on the determinants of disposable 
income inequality. As in the case of market-based inequality, OLS with robust 
standard errors and two-stage least squares are the two techniques being used. 
Both of the estimated equations show the same goodness of fit. Once again all 
the parameter estimates display the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. They are also very similar in the magnitude of their effects with the 
exception of the parameter ( 11β ) on market-based income inequality. Its effect is 
the largest in the two-stage least squares estimation. In both equations, however, 
the expectation that a positive relationship prevails between market-based and 
disposable income inequality is confirmed.  
 
We turn now to the factors outlined in our argument early that will alter a one to 
one duplication of market income distribution in the distribution of disposable 
income. These three factors included the overall levels of coordination, the 
degree of unionization of the labor force, and the government’s partisan 
inheritance.23 All three of these factors’ parameters ( 12β  to 14β ) take on the 
expected negative values and are statistically significant. What are the 
implications of these values? First, in those societies where there is little or non-
                                                 
23 Some scholars have argued that any specification including both union density and partisan 
inheritance would be inappropriate precisely due to the presence of high levels of multicollinearity 
(Bradley et al., 2002). In our view, however, even if these three factors may partially co-vary, the 
causal logic linking each of these three factors to inequality is sufficiently independent to grant 
their individual inclusion in the model. In addition, from a statistical point of view, there are no 
compelling reasons to exclude any of these variables. None of the variables included in the model 
has a variance inflation factor higher than 1.3. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem. 
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existing coordination, employers have no incentive to accept redistribution 
through the welfare state. Alternatively, in those societies where firms pool risks 
through cross-shareholding and coordinate with labor, employers concede higher 
levels of redistribution. In other words, economic coordination brings down the 
level of inequality in disposable income. 
  
Table 11: Estimation Results for the Disposable 
Income Inequality Equation (Equation # 3) 
 
 OLS  
(robust 
se) 
TSLS  
(se) 
 
Market-
Based 
Income 
Inequality 
 
 
.326*** 
(.069) 
 
 
.444*** 
(.093) 
 
 
Coordinated 
Market  
Economy 
 
-.042*** 
(.005) 
 
-.039*** 
(.008) 
 
 
Union  
Density 
 
-.0009*** 
(.0001) 
 
-.0008*** 
(.0004) 
 
 
Left 
Government 
Inheritance 
 
-.019*** 
(.005) 
 
-.017*** 
(.007) 
 
 
Constant  
 
.242*** 
(.032) 
 
.190*** 
(.042) 
 
  
R 2=.87 
n = 41 
 
 
 
R 2=.87 
n = 41 
 
 
*** p<.01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
 
Our findings on the role of union density conform to results previously developed 
by other scholars (Huber and Stephens, 2001 and Bradley et al., 2002). In those 
societies where larger shares of workers are unionized, governments need to be 
more responsive to labor’s demand for insurance and redistribution. Therefore, 
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ceteris paribus, larger unions imply more compressed distributions of disposable 
income. Finally, left-wing partisan inheritance reduces inequality through the 
long-term institutionalization of higher levels of redistribution.24 This result is 
consistent with the recent findings by Iversen and Soskice (2003) about the 
cumulative impact of government partisanship on poverty reduction.  
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Disposable Income Inequality  
(predicted values based on Table 12,  OLS) 
 
Low overall 
coordination  
High overall 
coordination 
 
Low 
union 
density 
High 
union 
density 
Low 
union 
density 
High 
union 
density 
 
 
Left-wing 
partisanship 
inheritance 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.20 
 
 
Right-wing 
partisanship 
inheritance 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.23 
 
 
The magnitudes of the effects of interest are analyzed in Table 12, where the 
predicted values of the Gini coefficient for disposable income inequality based on 
the OLS model in Table 11 are presented. The values in Table 12 are the 
predicted levels of disposable income inequality under different combinations of 
partisanship, union density and economic coordination.25 Market-based income 
                                                 
24 Our results are in no way dependent on the use of either the total population or the “working-
age population” that Bradley et al. (2003) employ. The parameter estimates and the associated 
statistics are practically the same as those found in Table 12. As in footnote 22, the results are 
available from the authors.  
25 In calculating the predictions for Table 12 “low” and “high” refer, respectively,  to the minimum 
and the maximum values in the sample.  As it was the case in Table 10, high coordination refers 
to the maximum value of the wage bargaining coordination index in our data set, which is a value 
of four.  No coordination means fragmented wage bargaining (0). In the case of union density a 
low value means that only 10% of the labor force is unionized, whereas a high value implies that 
this percentage rises up to 87.9%. Finally, a low value (0.27) represents right-wing partisan 
inheritance, whereas a value of 1.77 captures the far left partisan inheritance.  
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inequality is set at its mean value (0.39).  This exercise reveals that union density 
can reduce the Gini coefficient of disposable income inequality by up to seven 
points. This implies that in countries with strong unions the amount of 
redistribution necessary to achieve a perfectly egalitarian society is nearly seven 
points lower.  In turn, overall economic coordination and partisanship inheritance 
reduce such amount by four and three points respectively.  
 
An alternative way of reading the results reported in Table 12 would be the 
following: holding all other variables constant, a change from the minimum to the 
maximum observed level of union density (see previous footnote) implies a 22 % 
proportional reduction in the value of the Gini coefficient. With similar kinds of 
changes in the levels of overall economic coordination (that is from 0 to 0.95) and  
partisan inheritance (that is from 1.27 to 2.78), proportional reductions in the level 
of disposable income inequality equal to 13% and 9% respectively would be 
brought about. 
 
Even if independent from each other, the effects of union density, economic 
coordination and partisan inheritance combine very differently in the real world. In 
some countries, such as the Scandinavian nations, all three factors will be very 
high, thus reducing disposable income inequality to its lowest observed levels. In 
some other countries, the situation is reversed: coordination, union density and 
partisan inheritance are very low and, as a result, disposable income inequality 
reaches its maximum levels. These patterns may lead the reader to wonder 
about the existence of complementarities between some of these elements, for 
instance left-wing parties and overall economic coordination. This being the case, 
an interaction effect between these two factors should be observed. If left-wing 
parties facilitate the existence of wage bargaining agreements and depend upon 
them to create an egalitarian wage distribution, should the capacity of left-wing 
parties to shape the distribution of disposable income not be contingent as well 
upon the overall degree of coordination in the economy? The answer is that no 
such complementarity is in place, as confirmed by the re-estimation, including 
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interaction terms, of the models presented in Table 11.26 And the reason for this 
lies in how directly governments are able to shape the distribution of disposable 
income inequality as opposed to the distribution of earnings. As argued above, 
government’s effects on wage inequality are indirect in that they are contingent 
on the agreement of unions to wage moderation and high taxes on labor. Such 
agreement only takes place under conditions of high wage bargaining 
coordination, thereby producing the observed interaction effects. Alternatively, an 
increase in fiscal redistribution reduces inequality of disposable income directly, 
i.e., without any other actors taking part in shaping the final outcome. Thus, for a 
given value of market income inequality, left-wing governments can make use of 
fiscal redistribution to reduce inequality regardless of the institutional position of 
any other actor. As a result, no interaction effect is to be observed.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
How will inequality evolve in the future?  The answer to this question depends in 
part of what we can expect in terms of the factors examined in the paper. 
Consider first demographic and economic trends. In spite of significant cross-
national differences, female labor participation rates have uniformly expanded 
over the last few decades (Jaumotte, 2003). There is no reason to anticipate that 
they will not continue to expand even further. However, a countervailing tendency 
needs to be considered. The discrepancy between male and female wage rates 
has begun to decrease recently across the OECD countries (Blau and Kahn, 
2000). If this tendency continues, the inegalitarian effects associated with the 
increasing participation of women in the labor force will be muted. Should this 
tendency not continue, one would expect a further increase in the levels of wage 
inequality and subsequently, according to our model, a modest increase in the 
levels of market-based inequality.  
 
                                                 
26 Results are available from the authors upon request.  
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 OECD population structures have been steadily aging over the last few decades 
and the prospects are that they will continue to do so. Recent projections for the 
United Kingdom indicate that the ratio of the elderly (population over 65 years of 
age) to the working population (that between 20 and 64 years of age) will rise 
from 24%  in the year 2000 to 43% in 2040. Increases of similar or even higher 
magnitude are projected for other OECD nations (Visco,  2001). Our analysis 
suggests that if these forecasts materialize, further increases in market-based 
income inequality can be expected. In addition, the changing structure of 
financial markets adds new grounds for concern about the evolution of market-
based inequality. Becks et al. ‘ s (1999) study reveals that  levels of stock market 
capitalization have been increasing throughout  the OECD and other countries 
during the last few decades. In the absence of any change in this widespread 
trend, we can only conclude that market income inequality is likely to grow even 
more.27   
 
Whether these trends toward higher market inequalities carry over to the final 
disposable income will depend upon the future leverage of political actors and 
economic institutions. The levels of union density are generally declining 
(Western, 1997; Checchi and Visser, 2001). If this tendency continues, one can 
anticipate a reduction in unions’ capacity to promote an egalitarian wage 
distribution and high levels of fiscal redistribution.  However, as this very line of 
research has also pointed out, not all countries share in the decline. As a result, 
the levels of cross-national variation have actually increased. Thus, the varying 
fortunes of labor movements across advanced industrial societies will continue to 
foster cross-national variations in earnings and disposable income inequality.  
Contrary to the convergence school, a similar pattern of increasing variation is to 
be found in the evolution of economic institutions. While the pillars of social 
partnership are said to be crumbling in some coordinated market economies 
such as Germany (Streeck and Hassel, 2003), broader cross-national 
                                                 
27 The Japanese case during the nineties provides an example of shifting trends in the levels of 
stock market capitalization. Were this to become widespread, our expectation would need to be 
modified. 
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comparisons have failed to detect a consistent pattern of decline either in the 
levels of wage bargaining coordination or in the relations between organized 
labor and organized capital (Wallerstein and Golden, 2000). Finally, there seems 
to be no reason to expect partisan inheritance traditions to converge to the right 
in the medium run. In sum, the sources for divergence in distributive outcomes 
among advanced capitalist societies identified in this paper seem as if they will 
continue to remain in place, keeping the realities of inequality as distant from the 
“transatlantic consensus” as they are today.  
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